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Lorraine Daston’s recent monograph Against Nature is, ac-
cording to the book’s back cover, “[a] pithy work of philosophi-
cal anthropology [that] asks why we continually seek moral 
orders in natural orders…” Originally published in the “De Na-
tura” series, in 2018, with Matthes and Seitz Berlin, the book is 
now available as part of the MIT Press’s “Untimely Meditations 
Series.” 
Though the relationship between morality and nature has 
been previously analyzed by various philosophers, Daston 
takes a different tack. Unlike G.E. Moore, who famously ar-
gued that it’s fallacious to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ (Moore 
1967), and unlike John Stuart Mill, who argued that nature is 
frequently disvaluable (Mill 1874), Daston doesn’t attempt to 
criticize the moralization of nature. Nor, for that matter, does 
she attempt to defend the claim that nature should be morally 
valued. Instead, she seeks to explain why, in spite of compel-
ling objections to the contrary, human beings continue to invest 
nature with moral authority. More specifically, Daston thinks 
that the explanation has something to do with the sort of beings 
we are: something to do with human nature. 
Against Nature is comprised of eight chapters in total. Chap-
ters 2, 3, and 4, are about three different, but related, senses 
of the word “nature”. The first sense is specific nature. Spe-
cific nature is what we have in mind when we claim that it’s in 
something’s nature to do, or to be something. In other words, 
specific natures are essences: they’re the properties that make 
something the kind of thing it is, i.e., the properties that make 
a human being a human being, a tree a tree, a squirrel a squir-
rel, etc. (7). The second sense is local nature. Local natures, 
according to Daston, are “the characteristic combinations of 
flora and fauna, climate and geology that give a landscape its 
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physiognomy: the desert oasis or the tropical rainforest, the 
Mediterranean shore or the Swiss Alps” (15). Though local na-
ture is an old concept, local natures were reimagined by 17th 
and 18th century theorists as systems, each of which is com-
prised of interconnected elements that have their own distinct 
roles, i.e., local natures were reimagined as ecosystems (18). 
The third sense of ‘nature’ refers to universal natural laws: the 
sort of laws that scientists posit in their efforts to understand 
the phenomena (23).   
So why do human beings currently, and throughout history, 
imbue nature’s orders with moral authority? Daston’s threefold 
answer is provided over the course of Chapters 6 and 7. The 
first piece of the puzzle is that normativity (including moral 
normativity) has a conceptual connection with order (48-51). 
More specifically, norms have a certain amount of consisten-
cy and generality built into them, and norms are a basis upon 
which people predict each other’s behavior and form expecta-
tions of one another. The second piece of the puzzle is that 
we use representation to understand things (52-53). Using the 
various natural orders, we encounter and perceive, to try to un-
derstand morality, is something that comes naturally to us, so 
to speak. The third and final piece of the puzzle is that natural 
orders are far more numerous and visible than human-made 
orders are (55-64). 
Since Against Nature is short, readable, and inexpensive, I 
think that buying it is well worth the reader’s resources. The 
word ‘nature’ has a number of different uses, and Daston’s ef-
forts to distinguish them and yet also show how they’re related, 
will be of interest to philosophers working in metaphysics, epis-
temology, the philosophy of science, environmental philosophy, 
and moral philosophy. As a bonus, the book contains a series 
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of illustrative figures, e.g., an image of Schopin’s The Children 
of Israel Crossing the Red Sea, and a photo of the Strasbourg 
Cathedral’s Astronomical Clock. The book is engaging enough 
without these images, but they’re entertaining nonetheless.  
Though Daston briefly mentions John Stuart Mill’s critique 
of nature (4-5), one problem with her book is that she never ex-
plicitly discusses his distinction between the wide and narrow 
senses of ‘nature’, i.e., his distinction between an amoral sense 
that literally includes all phenomena; and a narrower, moral-
ized sense that specifically refers to that which exists, or oc-
curs, independently of human agency. To be fair, Daston seems 
aware that we frequently employ the narrow usage of ‘nature’: 
she notes that we use the word to distinguish that which is in-
born from that which is cultivated, and that which is wild from 
that which is civilized (7). She also observes that while some 
cultures distinguish the human from the natural, others don’t 
(57-60). Still it would have been useful for her to explicitly dis-
cuss Mill’s distinction and how it relates to the three senses of 
‘nature’ that she herself distinguishes. Upon inspection, Mill’s 
narrow sense of ‘nature’ was sometimes implicit in Daston’s 
observations. For example, in Chapter 2, Daston is careful to 
note that the categories associated with specific natures are 
different from human-made categories. Things with specific 
natures (things that belong to natural kinds) reproduce them-
selves, whereas human artifacts do not (12). Of course, the dis-
tinction between natural categories and human-made catego-
ries, presupposes Mill’s narrow sense of ‘nature’. 
In other places, Mill’s narrow sense challenges Daston’s 
claims. For example, in Chapter 8, Daston contends that na-
ture isn’t inherently conservative. Though she’s right to claim 
there are many natural orders to choose from, and that some of 
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those orders, when moralized, yield reformist or revolutionary 
conclusions, rather than conservative ones, e.g., the matriarchal 
social structures bees form (68-69), narrow nature does seem 
to be inherently conservative. After all, progress requires the 
exercise of agency. Social progress requires that we critically 
analyze the norms we grew up with and make conscious chang-
es to them. Medical progress requires that we use our agency 
to challenge natural states of affairs, e.g., to cure disease and to 
prevent death. One particularly important form of progress – 
reducing wild animal suffering – will require significant inter-
ference with narrow nature. Most individual wild animals die 
painfully at a very young age, and those who live to maturity 
suffer significant burdens such as disease, parasites, recurring 
hunger, and the threat of predators. Significantly improving 
their lives will require that we interfere with wild ecosystems 
(Johannsen 2021).  
Notwithstanding my concerns above, Against Nature is an 
engaging book that substantially contributes to our understand-
ing of the relationship between morality and nature. I highly 
recommend it. 
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